Privatae
215 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
215 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
package main
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// contextsock.go — how a person's own context surface reaches the daemon, on a
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// machine where the daemon is not theirs.
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//
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// THE PROBLEM, stated plainly. The context surface (contextui.go) runs as the
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// person, which is what makes it safe: the files it can draw are the ones the
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// kernel already lets them open. But ASKING for a folder to become context has
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// to reach the host, and the only thing on the box with a tunnel is the daemon.
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// Its loopback endpoint is guarded by the OperatorSecret, which lives at 0600
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// in the daemon's own config dir — and a non-root person cannot read it, which
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// is correct, because that same secret opens the git-credential lane.
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//
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// So on a single-user machine the ask works (the daemon is that person's) and
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// on a networked bastion it does not. That gap shipped, and the page said so in
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// words, which is better than failing silently and still not good enough.
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//
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// THE FIX, AND WHY IT IS THIS ONE. The daemon needs to know WHO is asking, and
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// it must not learn it from anything the asker says — a client that states its
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// own username is a client that can state somebody else's. Every local IPC on
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// every platform this binary targets can ask the KERNEL who is on the other end
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// of a connection:
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//
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// linux SO_PEERCRED on a unix socket -> uid, gid, pid
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// darwin LOCAL_PEERCRED / getpeereid -> uid, gid
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// windows GetNamedPipeClientProcessId + the
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// process token -> the caller's SID
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//
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// That is the same principle as the sanction mark being keyed on the kernel's
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// executable path rather than argv[0] (sanction.go), and as the context
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// surface's file walk being done BY the user rather than filtered FOR them:
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// where an answer can come from the kernel, this code does not decide it.
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//
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// WHAT THE DAEMON DOES WITH THE IDENTITY. It forwards the draft with the
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// asking user's name attached, and the draft still lands INERT — a person on
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// the host approves it with a step-up code before a single file is read
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// (addfolder.go:13-15). Nothing here grants anything. The identity is what
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// makes "the username is the ceiling for their own context folder" enforceable
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// rather than asserted: the daemon knows who asked because the kernel told it,
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// so the ask cannot be made in somebody else's name.
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"time"
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)
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// contextSockName is the socket the daemon listens on. It sits in the DAEMON's
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// config dir, and its permissions are the first gate: 0666 on the socket itself
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// so any local user can connect, because the identity check is the kernel's and
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// not the filesystem's. The DIRECTORY above it is 0700, so this is deliberate
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// and needs saying — see contextSockListen.
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const contextSockName = "context.sock"
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// contextAskRequest is what a person's surface sends. NOTE WHAT IS NOT IN IT:
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// no username, no uid, no token. Anything the client could put here is
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// something the client could lie about, so the daemon reads the identity off
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// the connection instead and this carries only the request itself.
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type contextAskRequest struct {
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Root string `json:"root"`
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Name string `json:"display_name"`
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}
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type contextAskReply struct {
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OK bool `json:"ok"`
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Host string `json:"host,omitempty"`
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Why string `json:"why,omitempty"`
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// User is the name the DAEMON resolved from the kernel, echoed back so the
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// person can see whose ask it was recorded as. If this ever disagrees with
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// who they think they are, that is worth them noticing.
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User string `json:"user,omitempty"`
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}
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// contextSockPath is MACHINE-WIDE, not per-user, and that was the bug that made
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// the first version of this dead code.
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//
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// It lived under configDir(), which is os.UserConfigDir()-derived — so the root
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// daemon bound a path inside /root/.config and the person dialled one inside
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// their own home. Two different sockets that could never meet, in exactly the
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// case this endpoint exists for. The client fell back silently every time and
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// the daemon logged an address nothing was listening on.
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//
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// /var/run is the right home and it is not only about agreement:
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//
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// - It is ROOT-OWNED on every unix this ships to, so only root can create the
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// directory. A non-root process cannot squat this path and pose as the
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// daemon, which a world-writable /tmp would have allowed outright.
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// - It is a tmpfs, so a stale socket does not survive a reboot.
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//
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// The client additionally requires the socket to be OWNED BY ROOT before it
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// will send anything (contextSockDialable). Belt to the directory's brace: if
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// the path is ever reachable by another uid, an impostor still cannot be
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// mistaken for the daemon.
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func contextSockPath() (string, error) {
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return filepath.Join(contextSockDir, contextSockName), nil
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}
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// ── the daemon side ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// startContextSock serves asks from local users until ctx ends.
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//
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// It is started by the daemon, so it runs with the daemon's rights — which is
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// the point: it can read the OperatorSecret and reach the tunnel, and the
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// person asking cannot.
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func startContextSock(done <-chan struct{}) {
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p, err := contextSockPath()
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if err != nil {
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uilogf("context socket: %v\n", err)
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return
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}
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ln, err := contextSockListen(p)
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if err != nil {
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// Not fatal to the daemon. A box with no local users asking for context
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// is the ordinary case, and the rest of the bastion must not stop
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// because an IPC endpoint could not bind.
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uilogf("context socket not available (%v) — `privatae-bastion context` "+
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"will say so rather than failing quietly\n", err)
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return
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}
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go func() {
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<-done
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_ = ln.Close()
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_ = os.Remove(p)
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}()
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go func() {
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for {
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c, err := ln.Accept()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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go contextSockServe(c)
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}
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}()
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uilogf("context socket listening on %s\n", p)
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}
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func contextSockServe(c net.Conn) {
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defer c.Close()
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_ = c.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second))
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// THE IDENTITY, FROM THE KERNEL, BEFORE THE REQUEST IS EVEN READ. Order
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// matters: nothing the client sends should be able to influence how it is
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// identified, and the surest way to guarantee that is to have the answer
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// already in hand.
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user, err := contextPeerUser(c)
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if err != nil {
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_ = json.NewEncoder(c).Encode(contextAskReply{Why: "this machine could not " +
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"establish who is asking (" + err.Error() + "), so it will not forward the " +
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"request. An ask that cannot be attributed is one nobody can approve."})
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return
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}
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var req contextAskRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(c).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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_ = json.NewEncoder(c).Encode(contextAskReply{User: user, Why: "the request could not be read"})
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return
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}
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sent, host, note := contextForwardDraftAs(req.Root, req.Name, user)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(c).Encode(contextAskReply{OK: sent, Host: host, Why: note, User: user})
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}
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// ── the asking side ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// contextAskViaSock hands one draft to the daemon and returns what it said.
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func contextAskViaSock(root, name string) (sent bool, host, note string, available bool) {
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p, err := contextSockPath()
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if err != nil {
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return false, "", err.Error(), false
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}
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if why := contextSockDialable(p); why != "" {
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// A socket at the right path that is NOT root's is not the daemon.
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// Refusing loudly rather than falling back: the fallback path would
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// send this person's folder somewhere, and "somewhere" is the problem.
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return false, "", why, true
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}
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c, err := net.DialTimeout("unix", p, 5*time.Second)
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if err != nil {
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// The daemon may be older than this socket, not running, or running as
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// somebody whose config dir this process cannot even see. All three
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// mean the same thing to the caller: this route is not available, try
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// the direct one.
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return false, "", "", false
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}
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defer c.Close()
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_ = c.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second))
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if err := json.NewEncoder(c).Encode(contextAskRequest{Root: root, Name: name}); err != nil {
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return false, "", err.Error(), true
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}
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var rep contextAskReply
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if err := json.NewDecoder(c).Decode(&rep); err != nil {
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return false, "", "the bastion did not answer: " + err.Error(), true
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}
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if !rep.OK {
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return false, rep.Host, rep.Why, true
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}
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return true, rep.Host, "", true
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}
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// contextSockUnsupported is the note used where the platform has no
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// implementation yet, so the reason a person sees names the platform rather
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// than pretending the feature is merely broken.
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var contextSockUnsupported = errors.New("peer identity over a local socket is not " +
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"implemented for this platform yet")
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func contextSockFmtUser(uid uint32, name string) string {
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if name != "" {
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return name
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}
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return fmt.Sprintf("uid %d", uid)
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}
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