# Ops and action ops ## Ops: programs your host wrote, run in a sandbox first A host can ship an op, a small program (`op.yaml` plus `run`) it wrote and tested, identified by the sha256 of its contents. It runs here only under terms the host signed and you approved: once, with these parameters, or as a standing grant with parameter bounds, an expiry and a use count (never as root). Every run is a dry run first, in a throwaway sandbox with no network, an overlay over this machine's disks, and this bastion's own records masked; it reports what the op would create, change and remove. An op sees only the system's programs and libraries, a few `/etc` files that hold no secret, and the paths its manifest declares (its effects and its `reads`). Every other file and folder is covered with an empty one. A link is left in place, so an op can read where a link points, but not what is there. The op can also see the names of the folders it was denied, in its own mount table. A declared path that reaches a credential store is refused, as written and as it resolves, and checked again at every run. The stores are `/root`, `/etc/ssh`, `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/wireguard`, `/etc/systemd`, docker's and k3s's keys and more, plus any path you list in this machine's `sensitive_paths`. Covers are put on paths, so a bind mount or a hard link that you make yourself, putting a credential file inside a declared path, is seen through it. List such a path in `sensitive_paths`. Anything outside the op's declared file effects refuses the run. Applying is the same run again, then a check in a fresh sandbox. A one-time apply is bound to the change list the dry run showed you, and lands nothing else. A run under a standing grant is bound to the grant's parameter bounds and the op's declared effects instead: you approved the grant, not each run's change list. Linux only, and file effects only; other platforms refuse every op and say so. `privatae-bastion ops` lists what is held, and `ops drop ` takes a standing grant back. ## Action ops: ship steps, run the same way A ship step acts rather than edits: it builds and pushes an image, moves a source tree to a new commit, restarts a service, rolls a workload. An op with `kind: action` does this in two parts, and approving it works the same way: a dry run first, then an apply bound to the change list the dry run showed. - **The op's program runs unprivileged.** Each run gets a uid no earlier run had, in its own systemd transient unit, with no capabilities and no new privileges. This machine's files are read-only to it: it writes only to a private work folder at `/tmp` and its own throwaway `/run` and `/var/tmp`. It sees only what a files op sees (above). - **Its network, in an apply,** reaches only the `destinations` it declares (`host:port`): - the unit's address allowlist holds it to the addresses those names resolved to when the run began; - Landlock holds its TCP connections to the declared ports, and blocks abstract unix sockets and signals outside the sandbox; - UDP is held to the declared addresses but not to their ports, and a port declared for one address is open on every declared address; - a destination on this machine, a link-local address, or a cloud's metadata service is refused, as written and as resolved; - on a machine no fleet has anchored (your own machine), so is a private, ULA, CGNAT or reserved address: one written as an address is refused when the op arrives, and a name is refused at apply if any address it resolves to is one. A verb's fetch (`tree.checkout`, and `k8s.set_image`'s ancestry check) is held the same way, its host checked once and git held to that address, which needs git 2.37 or newer; on an anchored machine that fetch is held to its checked address too, and is never this machine, its loopback, a link-local address or a metadata service. An image whose registry is on your network or this machine is never put live: it is refused when a program reports it and when `k8s.set_image` would set it. To reach another computer on your network, install a bastion on that computer and run the op there. An anchored machine keeps private destinations, because a fleet's ship steps reach its private control planes. **A dry run has no network at all,** because nobody approved it. - **Memory: no ceiling, and the op goes first.** A run may use whatever memory the machine has to spare. It is the first thing stopped when the machine runs short: - the kernel, if it must kill, kills the op before anything else; - the bastion stops the op when free memory falls to a floor. The floor is the largest of 1 GiB, 5% of memory, and, on a Kubernetes node, the kubelet's own eviction line (hard or soft) plus 512 MiB, so the op goes before any pod is evicted. A kubelet setting it cannot read raises the floor, never lowers it; - the bastion also stops the op when the machine's services, pods, users or another op running beside it start waiting on memory: 7 points more of the time than the least they had during the run. The op's own waits don't count, and neither does a group that was already waiting, such as a pod at its own limit; - a machine already under the floor starts no op; - a run counts as stopped only if the kill landed. The refusal says what happened and how much the op had used. - **Credentials:** it is handed the `credentials` it declares, sealed by the host to this machine's encryption key and bound to that run, in its environment only. A credential a verb names goes to the verb, never to the program. They are scrubbed from its output and gone when the run ends. A dry run is handed none. - **The builder:** an op that declares `builder` reaches this machine's builder socket in an apply, never in a dry run, and never through a privileged group. - **Root work is done by this bastion, as named verbs** the manifest declares with their arguments written in: - `tree.checkout` moves an existing git tree forward to an exact commit from its own origin. It runs only in a tree root owns, whose `.git` no one else can write, and never writes into a folder another user controls. It never runs the tree's hooks, never overwrites an ignored file the machine keeps, and refuses a tree with local changes or a git config that could run a program. - `unit.reload` and `unit.restart` act on one systemd service, never the bastion's own. - `k8s.set_image` sets one container's image to a digest, only forward: - the digest needs a receipt this machine signed for an image one of its op runs reported, built from the repository the manifest names; - its commit must descend from the one behind the live image; - the live image's commit counts only if this machine rolled it. An image it did not roll is refused, and the refusal says so. - `logs.check` returns a verdict and one line, read after the apply. Only a commit and a digest may come from the run's parameters. The program cannot ask for a verb. An op with verbs is root, so it is never a standing grant. What a program pushed becomes a receipt, signed by this machine. The heartbeat says whether this machine can run action ops (`action_ops`) and carries its encryption key, signed by the machine's own key. A run that this bastion's restart cut short leaves nothing: the next start unmounts its files and stops its unit.