"""bastion agent query endpoint — the container on the mesh.

The other half of "access moves, data does not". Serves the owner's host
and the manifest's grantees over MUTUAL TLS; nothing here ever reads the
extract store, the vault, or the vectors' raw table for a client — the
only bytes that leave are sanitized chunks and catalog cards.

Identity is the presented client certificate:
  - the TLS layer requires a client cert that chains to FREEAGENT_CA_ROOT
    (ssl.CERT_REQUIRED); no cert or a foreign CA never reaches a handler
  - the cert's CN is the caller. CN == manifest owner.host → owner.
    CN in manifest.grants (and today <= until) → grantee with that entry's
    ops. Anyone else who chained → 403, audited.

Ops (JSON over HTTPS):
  POST /search      {query, k?}           search  (owner, grantee w/ op)
  POST /read_range  {doc, start, end}     read_range (owner, grantee w/ op)
                                          from the SANITIZED store only,
                                          <= READ_RANGE_MAX bytes
  GET  /catalog[?prefix=&offset=&limit=]  owner only: the file cards (paged)
  GET  /catalog/dirs[?...]                owner only: the directory cards (paged)
  GET  /status                            owner only: run.state.json
  GET  /health                            any chained cert: {ok, id}

The manifest is re-read and re-gated (signature verified) whenever its
file changes: revoke a grant = drop the entry, re-sign, and the next
request is refused. A manifest that no longer passes the gate makes the
server refuse everything but /health until it does.

Every request is audited to <out>/serve.audit.jsonl: CN, op, status,
bytes, a sha256 of the query (never the query), doc id for read_range.

Bind: --bind or FREEAGENT_BIND (host:port, default [::]:8470). The bastion
binds 127.0.0.1:0 and reads the port from --port-file, so it is the only
client; bind another interface only for another machine to reach. Server
cert and key: FREEAGENT_TLS_CERT / FREEAGENT_TLS_KEY. Stdlib only; the embedding endpoint is the same sensor `search`
already uses.
"""

import datetime as _dt
import hashlib
import json
import os
import ssl
import sys
import threading
import urllib.parse
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer

from . import embed as _embed
from .manifest import ManifestError, load_manifest
from .run import GateError, verify_signature
from .sanitize import store_path as sanitized_store_path

DEFAULT_BIND = "[::]:8470"
MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
READ_RANGE_MAX = 64 * 1024
SEARCH_K_MAX = 50
CATALOG_PAGE_DEFAULT = 500
CATALOG_PAGE_MAX = 2000
OWNER_OPS = ("search", "read_range", "catalog", "status")


class ServeError(Exception):
    pass


def parse_bind(bind):
    bind = bind.strip()
    if bind.startswith("["):
        host, _, port = bind[1:].partition("]")
        port = port.lstrip(":")
    else:
        host, _, port = bind.rpartition(":")
    if not host or not port.isdigit():
        raise ServeError("FREEAGENT_BIND must be host:port or [v6]:port, got %r" % bind)
    return host, int(port)


def peer_cn(cert):
    for rdn in (cert or {}).get("subject", ()):
        for k, v in rdn:
            if k == "commonName":
                return v
    return None


class Policy:
    """Who may do what, from a gated manifest. Reloads on file change."""

    def __init__(self, manifest_path, env, allow_unsigned=False, today=None):
        self.path = manifest_path
        self.env = env
        self.allow_unsigned = allow_unsigned
        self.today = today
        self._mtime = None
        self.manifest = None
        self.gate_error = None
        self._lock = threading.Lock()
        self.reload()

    def reload(self):
        with self._lock:
            try:
                mtime = os.stat(self.path).st_mtime_ns
            except OSError as e:
                self.manifest, self.gate_error = None, "manifest unreadable: %s" % e
                return
            if mtime == self._mtime and (self.manifest or self.gate_error):
                return
            self._mtime = mtime
            try:
                m = load_manifest(self.path)
            except ManifestError as e:
                self.manifest, self.gate_error = None, "manifest invalid: %s" % "; ".join(e.errors)
                return
            except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001
                # FAIL CLOSED here too: a manifest that cannot be read at all
                # (permissions, bad encoding) must not leave the previous one
                # in force once _mtime has advanced.
                self.manifest, self.gate_error = None, "manifest unreadable: %s" % e
                return
            try:
                verify_signature(m, self.env, manifest_dir=os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(self.path)))
            except GateError as e:
                if not self.allow_unsigned:
                    self.manifest, self.gate_error = None, "gate: %s" % e
                    return
            except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001
                # FAIL CLOSED: an unexpected error in the gate must never leave
                # the previous manifest in force (_mtime is already advanced).
                self.manifest, self.gate_error = None, "gate: %s" % e
                return
            self.manifest, self.gate_error = m, None

    def allowed_ops(self, cn):
        """Ops for this CN, or an empty tuple. Owner gets everything the
        mask permits; a grantee gets its entry's ops while unexpired."""
        self.reload()
        m = self.manifest
        if m is None or not cn:
            return ()
        if cn == m.owner_host:
            ops = list(OWNER_OPS)
            if "search" not in m.mask:
                ops.remove("search")
            return tuple(ops)
        today = self.today or _dt.datetime.now(_dt.timezone.utc).date()
        for g in m.grants:
            if g.host == cn:
                if today > g.until:
                    return ()
                return tuple(g.ops)
        return ()


HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT = 10


class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    server_version = "freeagent"
    protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
    # keep-alive is one thread per connection here; an idle client must not
    # pin that thread forever (a bastion review measured exactly that)
    timeout = 60

    def setup(self):
        # The TLS handshake happens HERE, in this connection's own thread —
        # never in the accept loop. Wrapping the listening socket (the first
        # cut) ran every handshake synchronously in accept(), so one idle
        # pre-auth TCP connection stalled every client.
        # The raw socket arrives with a short timeout from get_request, so a
        # peer that connects and says nothing is dropped after
        # HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT, and only its own thread waited.
        self.request = self.server.ssl_ctx.wrap_socket(
            self.request, server_side=True, do_handshake_on_connect=False)
        self.request.do_handshake()
        self.connection = self.request
        super().setup()
    policy = None      # injected by build_server
    out_dir = None
    env = None
    embed_endpoint = None
    audit_lock = threading.Lock()

    # ── plumbing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    def _cn(self):
        try:
            return peer_cn(self.connection.getpeercert())
        except (AttributeError, ValueError):
            return None

    def _send(self, code, obj, cn=None, op=None, extra=None):
        body = json.dumps(obj, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
        self.send_response(code)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)
        self._audit(cn, op, code, len(body), extra)

    def _audit(self, cn, op, status, nbytes, extra):
        rec = {"ts": _dt.datetime.now(_dt.timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"),
               "cn": cn, "op": op, "path": self.path, "status": status, "bytes": nbytes}
        if extra:
            rec.update(extra)
        with self.audit_lock:
            with open(os.path.join(self.out_dir, "serve.audit.jsonl"), "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
                fh.write(json.dumps(rec, sort_keys=True) + "\n")

    def _body(self):
        n = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or 0)
        if n > MAX_BODY:
            raise ValueError("body too large")
        raw = self.rfile.read(n) if n else b"{}"
        obj = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
        if not isinstance(obj, dict):
            raise ValueError("body must be a JSON object")
        return obj

    def _authorize(self, op):
        cn = self._cn()
        allowed = self.policy.allowed_ops(cn)
        if op in allowed:
            return cn, None
        if self.policy.gate_error:
            return cn, (503, {"error": "manifest not serving: %s" % self.policy.gate_error})
        return cn, (403, {"error": "not permitted for %s: %s" % (cn or "no-cn", op)})

    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        pass  # the audit file is the log; no request lines on stderr

    # ── routes ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    def do_GET(self):
        cn = self._cn()
        if self.path == "/health":
            m = self.policy.manifest
            self.policy.reload()
            self._send(200, {"ok": True, "id": m.id if m else None,
                             "serving": self.policy.gate_error is None}, cn, "health")
            return
        route, _, qs = self.path.partition("?")
        if route in ("/catalog", "/catalog/dirs"):
            # /catalog = file cards; /catalog/dirs = directory cards — the MAP
            # (sizes, types, newest change, keywords, entity counts per folder)
            # a host plans a cleanup or an archive from without reading a file.
            # PAGED: ?prefix=<path prefix>&offset=<n>&limit=<n> — a big store's
            # file cards are megabytes and a client's reply cap is finite.
            cn, denied = self._authorize("catalog")
            if denied:
                self._send(denied[0], denied[1], cn, "catalog")
                return
            q = urllib.parse.parse_qs(qs)
            prefix = (q.get("prefix") or [""])[0]
            try:
                offset = max(0, int((q.get("offset") or ["0"])[0]))
                limit = max(1, min(CATALOG_PAGE_MAX, int((q.get("limit") or [str(CATALOG_PAGE_DEFAULT)])[0])))
            except ValueError:
                self._send(400, {"error": "offset/limit must be integers"}, cn, "catalog")
                return
            name = "catalog.dirs.jsonl" if route.endswith("/dirs") else "catalog.jsonl"
            path = os.path.join(self.out_dir, name)
            if not os.path.exists(path):
                self._send(404, {"error": "no catalog yet — the first sweep has not finished"}, cn, "catalog")
                return
            with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
                cards = [json.loads(l) for l in fh]
            if prefix:
                cards = [c for c in cards if str(c.get("path", "")).startswith(prefix)]
            total = len(cards)
            page = cards[offset:offset + limit]
            nxt = offset + limit if offset + limit < total else None
            self._send(200, {"cards": page, "kind": "dirs" if name.endswith("dirs.jsonl") else "files",
                             "total": total, "offset": offset, "limit": limit, "next_offset": nxt,
                             "prefix": prefix},
                       cn, "catalog", {"kind": name, "n": len(page), "total": total})
            return
        if self.path == "/status":
            cn, denied = self._authorize("status")
            if denied:
                self._send(denied[0], denied[1], cn, "status")
                return
            path = os.path.join(self.out_dir, "run.state.json")
            state = {}
            if os.path.exists(path):
                with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
                    state = json.load(fh)
            self._send(200, {"state": state}, cn, "status")
            return
        self._send(404, {"error": "not found"}, cn, None)

    def do_POST(self):
        if self.path == "/search":
            cn, denied = self._authorize("search")
            if denied:
                self._send(denied[0], denied[1], cn, "search")
                return
            try:
                req = self._body()
                query = req["query"]
                k = int(req.get("k", 5))
                if not isinstance(query, str) or not query.strip():
                    raise ValueError("query must be a non-empty string")
                k = max(1, min(SEARCH_K_MAX, k))
            except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError) as e:
                self._send(400, {"error": "bad request: %s" % e}, cn, "search")
                return
            qhash = hashlib.sha256(query.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:16]
            try:
                hits = _embed.search(self.policy.manifest, self.out_dir, query, k=k,
                                     env=self.env, endpoint=self.embed_endpoint)
            except (_embed.EmbedError, OSError) as e:
                self._send(502, {"error": "search unavailable: %s" % e}, cn, "search", {"q": qhash})
                return
            self._send(200, {"hits": hits, "k": k}, cn, "search", {"q": qhash, "hits": len(hits)})
            return
        if self.path == "/read_range":
            cn, denied = self._authorize("read_range")
            if denied:
                self._send(denied[0], denied[1], cn, "read_range")
                return
            try:
                req = self._body()
                doc = req["doc"]
                start = int(req.get("start", 0))
                end = int(req["end"])
                if not isinstance(doc, str) or len(doc) != 64 or not all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in doc):
                    raise ValueError("doc must be a sanitized-document sha256")
                if start < 0 or end <= start:
                    raise ValueError("start/end out of order")
                end = min(end, start + READ_RANGE_MAX)
            except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError) as e:
                self._send(400, {"error": "bad request: %s" % e}, cn, "read_range")
                return
            path = sanitized_store_path(self.out_dir, doc)  # the ONLY store with a route
            if not os.path.exists(path):
                self._send(404, {"error": "no such document"}, cn, "read_range", {"doc": doc[:12]})
                return
            with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
                text = fh.read()
            piece = text[start:end]
            self._send(200, {"doc": doc, "start": start, "end": start + len(piece),
                             "total": len(text), "text": piece},
                       cn, "read_range", {"doc": doc[:12], "chars": len(piece)})
            return
        self._send(404, {"error": "not found"}, self._cn(), None)


class _Server(ThreadingHTTPServer):
    daemon_threads = True
    ssl_ctx = None  # set by build_server; used by Handler.setup per connection

    def get_request(self):
        # Plain TCP accept; the handshake is the handler thread's job (Handler.setup).
        sock, addr = self.socket.accept()
        sock.settimeout(HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT)
        return sock, addr

    def handle_error(self, request, client_address):
        # a client that fails the TLS handshake (no cert, foreign CA) is the
        # expected case, not a bug: one line, no traceback, no audit row
        # (it never became a request)
        exc = sys.exc_info()[1]
        if isinstance(exc, (ssl.SSLError, ConnectionError, OSError)):
            sys.stderr.write("freeagent serve: rejected %s: %s\n" % (client_address[0], exc))
            return
        super().handle_error(request, client_address)


def build_ssl_context(cert, key, ca_root):
    for label, p in (("FREEAGENT_TLS_CERT", cert), ("FREEAGENT_TLS_KEY", key), ("FREEAGENT_CA_ROOT", ca_root)):
        if not p:
            raise ServeError("%s is not set — the endpoint is mTLS-only; refusing to serve" % label)
        if not os.path.exists(p):
            raise ServeError("%s=%s does not exist" % (label, p))
    ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
    ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
    ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
    ctx.load_verify_locations(ca_root)
    ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
    return ctx


def build_server(manifest_path, out_dir, env=None, allow_unsigned=False, bind=None,
                 embed_endpoint=None, today=None, port_file=None):
    env = dict(os.environ) if env is None else env
    ctx = build_ssl_context(env.get("FREEAGENT_TLS_CERT", ""), env.get("FREEAGENT_TLS_KEY", ""),
                            env.get("FREEAGENT_CA_ROOT", ""))
    policy = Policy(manifest_path, env, allow_unsigned=allow_unsigned, today=today)
    if policy.manifest is None and not allow_unsigned:
        raise ServeError("refusing to start: %s" % policy.gate_error)
    os.makedirs(out_dir, exist_ok=True)
    handler = type("BoundHandler", (Handler,), {
        "policy": policy, "out_dir": out_dir, "env": env, "embed_endpoint": embed_endpoint})
    host, port = parse_bind(bind or env.get("FREEAGENT_BIND", DEFAULT_BIND))
    srv = _Server((host, port), handler, bind_and_activate=False)
    if ":" in host:
        import socket
        srv.address_family = socket.AF_INET6
        srv.socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        srv.socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
    srv.server_bind()
    srv.server_activate()
    srv.ssl_ctx = ctx  # per-connection wrap in Handler.setup, not on the listener
    srv.policy = policy
    if port_file:
        # a supervisor (the bastion) binds port 0 and reads the real port here
        tmp = port_file + ".tmp"
        with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
            fh.write("%d\n" % srv.server_address[1])
        os.replace(tmp, port_file)
    return srv


def serve(manifest_path, out_dir, env=None, allow_unsigned=False, bind=None, log=None, port_file=None):
    log = log or (lambda s: sys.stderr.write(s + "\n"))
    srv = build_server(manifest_path, out_dir, env, allow_unsigned=allow_unsigned, bind=bind,
                       port_file=port_file)
    m = srv.policy.manifest
    log("freeagent serve: %s on %s (owner %s, %d grant(s), mTLS)" % (
        m.id if m else "?", srv.server_address[:2], m.owner_host if m else "?", len(m.grants) if m else 0))
    try:
        srv.serve_forever()
    finally:
        srv.server_close()